admin: per-area permissions on every route
Give each user independent read, write and delete flags per area (invoices, bingo, users), so someone can e.g. review and remove bingo incidents without being able to add any. The request method and path decide the flag needed: GET is read except the new/duplicate forms, POST to .../delete is delete, any other POST is write. Unmapped admin paths are superuser-only, and a test enumerates every registered admin route so a new one cannot ship without a rule. Pages follow the same flags: nav and dashboard tiles show readable areas only, write forms and delete buttons are hidden, and the datacenter form is shown read-only. Assisted-by: Claude:opus-5
This commit is contained in:
parent
9bf40690e5
commit
8471570187
13 changed files with 214 additions and 27 deletions
|
|
@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ Banking details and registration number are deliberately not on the public page
|
|||
- In-memory `RateLimit` (5 req/hour/IP) — see `lib/rate_limit.rb`
|
||||
- `Rack::Protection::AuthenticityToken` for CSRF (uses session-stored token)
|
||||
- `AdminAuth` (`lib/admin_auth.rb`, a Sinatra extension): session login at `/admin/login` against the `users` table (`lib/user.rb`, scrypt via OpenSSL, no gem). Session holds user id + `session_version` (bump = logged out everywhere). `ADMIN_USER`/`ADMIN_PASSWORD` bootstrap the first superuser on an empty table and otherwise work only while no active superuser exists (recovery; it re-creates that superuser). Login is rate-limited per IP (`LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT`, default 10/15 min).
|
||||
- Permissions (`lib/admin_acl.rb`): areas `invoices`, `bingo`, `users` × independent flags read/write/delete in `user_permissions` (read + delete without write is valid); superusers bypass. GET → read (…/new, …/duplicate → write), POST …/delete|…/disable → delete, other POST → write. Unmapped /admin paths are superuser-only, and `test/admin_acl_test.rb` fails if a registered admin route isn't mapped — add new admin routes to `AdminACL::RULES`. Views hide forms via `can?(area, perm)`; the server check is the real gate.
|
||||
- Honeypot field named `website` for spam
|
||||
- Static assets in `public/`; views in `views/`
|
||||
- Deploy: `Dockerfile` + `docker-compose.yml` (Traefik labels for asxp.io / www.asxp.io). Container joins two external Docker networks: `traefik` (ingress) and `storage` (Postgres + MinIO).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue